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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the population in prisons grows, and correspondingly the 
need for mental health services increases, reports continue to show 
that mental health treatment provided in most prisons falls below 
acceptable standards ethically, morally, and constitutionally.1  Not 
 
       †  J.D. Candidate 2006, American University Washington College of Law; 
B.S., Decision Sciences, Miami University, 1991.  The author thanks Professor 
Susan Schmeiser for her encouragement and guidance.  She also thanks Alyssa 
Zucker for her support as well as editing assistance.  The author’s course taken in 
Mental Health Law spurred the development of this Comment. 
 1. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND 
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2003), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf [hereinafter ILL-
EQUIPPED] (reporting on widely observed problems with adult prisoners in the 
U.S. who suffered from mental illnesses). 
1
Kosak: Comment: Mental Health Treatment and Mistreatment in Prisons
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
11KOSAK_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  10:03:51 AM 
390 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
only do prisoners rarely receive the necessary treatment, many 
times the prison system worsens the condition of the offender 
suffering from a mental illness.2  Not only do prison inmates have a 
constitutional right to treatment, doctors have an ethical obligation 
to provide adequate care to their patients, and society has a moral 
obligation to provide the resources necessary to adequately staff 
and supply prison health care systems.3  Additionally, society’s 
greatest opportunity to modify future behavior occurs when the 
mentally ill offender is in prison, because rarely do other treatment 
alternatives exist for the offender after release from prison.4 
In an effort to demonstrate the devastating nature of 
inadequate mental health treatment in prison, this Comment 
reviews the case of Mark Walker,5 a prisoner in the Montana prison 
system.6  By discussing the size of the prison population and 
estimated burden of the mental health needs in the prison in Part 
III, the author hopes to establish the scope of the impacted 
population, thereby providing a foundation for the importance of 
this issue in Part IV.7 
Focusing on the constitutional rights of prisoners, in Part V 
this Comment reviews the major case law regarding prisoners’ 
rights to mental health treatment, how prisoners can use the court 
system to enforce these rights, and the roadblocks to this 
enforcement—both those established by Congress and those that 
exist simply by the nature of our distributed court system.8  Finally, 
in Part VI, this Comment reviews a sampling of court cases that 
have resulted in improved mental health treatment programs in 
prison systems.9 
II. AN EXAMPLE OF MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN PRISON 
Mark Walker arrived at the Montana State Prison (MSP) on 
February 5, 1999, after having spent seven months in the Colorado 
 
 2. Id. at 153. 
 3. See generally Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A 
Guide to Law and Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 462 (1992) 
(presenting a model and rationale for mental health treatment in prisons). 
 4. ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 192. 
 5. Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872 (Mont. 2003). 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 8. See infra Part V. 
 9. See infra Part VI. 
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prison system.10  While incarcerated in the Colorado system, Walker 
was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and stabilized on 900 
milligrams of lithium a day.11  His mood was stable and the prison 
staff did not file any major disciplinary write-ups.12  Unfortunately, 
Walker’s experience in the Montana system was more eventful. 
Almost immediately upon arriving at MSP, Walker began 
complaining of stomach pains due to the lithium and requested 
food to take with his medication.13  Dr. David Schaefer, a MSP staff 
psychiatrist, was told of this as early as February 20, 1999, two weeks 
after Walker’s move to MSP.14  Not until March 11, 1999, did Dr. 
Schaefer actually see Walker, however, and then for less than thirty 
minutes.15  By this time Walker had stopped taking the lithium.16  
After reviewing Walker’s medical file and without any psychological 
testing, Dr. Schaefer stopped prescribing lithium for Walker.17  Dr. 
Schaefer believed that Walker had an antisocial personality with 
narcissistic traits rather than bipolar disorder.18  Soon after, Walker 
began receiving write-ups for serious disciplinary issues, starting at 
two a month and increasing to eleven a month.19 
Dr. Schoening, another doctor at MSP, diagnosed Walker as a 
self-mutilator and explained that self-mutilators in prison generally 
injure themselves to get to a less restrictive setting in the prison.20  
Even though Walker’s self-harm always resulted in a transfer to a 
more restrictive area, Dr. Schoening determined that Walker’s 
actions were an attempt to control his situation.21  Dr. Schoening 
also attributed Walker’s action of yelling all night long, and then 
being assaulted by the inmate at whom he was yelling, to poor 
judgment, not psychosis.22 
Over a five-day span in October 1999, Walker attempted 
suicide three times.23  Dr. Schaefer evaluated Walker again after the 
 
 10. Walker, 68 P.3d at 874. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 880. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 874-75. 
 20. Id. at 880. 
 21. Id. at 881. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 875. 
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first suicide attempt and determined that Walker was at chronic 
risk of harming himself, but reported that hopefully Walker “will 
fall short of killing himself.”24  He ordered Walker return to the 
maximum security area of the prison.25  To address his dangerous 
behavior, the prison ordered a series of Behavior Management 
Plans (BMPs).26  In a BMP, Walker was put in isolation and 
“privileges.”  His clothing, mattress, pillow, and all of his personal 
items were taken away.27  During some BMPs, the water to Walker’s 
sink and toilet would be turned off, depriving the inmate of 
drinking water, except during regular intervals determined by 
prison guards.28  Walker’s BMPs lasted days at a time, and 
sometimes for weeks.29  The privileges would be returned one by 
one as his behavior improved.30 
All BMPs were implemented in the isolation area of the prison, 
where each cell had only a cement bed, a cement table or desk, a 
stainless steel sink, a stainless steel toilet, and a stainless steel plate 
that served as a mirror.31  The cell did not have a window to the 
outside, so no natural light entered the cell.32  The cells were rarely 
cleaned, even when an inmate left and a new inmate was placed in 
the cell.33  Blood, vomit, feces, and other debris had often 
contaminated the cells for long periods of time.34  During one of 
Walker’s stays, a large amount of dried blood was on the wall 
because the previous inhabitant of that cell had smashed his head 
against the wall until he required hospitalization.35  No recreation 
yard time was allowed for inmates in this area.36  When a BMP was 
in force, an inmate was served only cold food that was unwrapped 
and passed through the same cell entry-slot as did the toilet 
cleaning tools.37 
Throughout his stay at MSP, Walker was placed on BMPs, and 
 
 24. Id. at 880. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 875. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 876. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 875. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 883. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 875. 
 37. Id. at 877. 
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with each BMP his behavior deteriorated.38  At one point he 
screamed for two days straight.39  He received over 100 write-ups 
and spent six months in lockdown.40  In January 2000, while on 
another BMP, Walker filed a pro se petition by dictating it to a 
neighboring inmate who was allowed the privilege of a pencil and 
paper.41 
In preparation for the hearing, Walker, along with his 
treatment history, was reviewed by two psychiatrists.42  During the 
hearings, each of these doctors gave the opinion that Walker was 
effectively treated with lithium while in Colorado, but was 
neglected and ignored at MSP.43  One doctor described the 
treatment Walker received as negligent and scandalous.44  Another 
found it “absolutely clear,” based on the psychological records from 
Colorado and Montana, as well as the depositions of other inmates 
regarding Walker’s behavior, that Walker suffered from a serious 
mental illness.45  That same doctor found it to be “inexcusable” that 
Walker was not medicated, especially considering the effectiveness 
of his treatment by medication in the past.46  The doctor concluded 
that MSP’s diagnosis that Walker did not have a serious mental 
illness was “preposterous and fell below the ethical standards for 
practicing medicine . . . .”47 
The Montana Supreme Court was outraged.  It found that, 
under the state constitutional right to human dignity, the prison 
deliberately disregarded the risk of harm to Walker by providing 
what the prison knew to be constitutionally inadequate mental 
health treatment.48  This state right to human dignity provides even 
greater protection than the federal and state prohibition against 
cruel and inhumane punishment.49  The court held that violations 
of basic rights under the federal and state constitutions would 
continue as long as the prison policies regarding BMPs remained 
 
 38. Id. at 882. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 877. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 881. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 884. 
 49. Id. at 883. 
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in place.50  The court also held that prison officials at MSP created 
conditions that exacerbated the inmates’ mental illnesses or 
destroyed their sanity.51  The court remanded the case to the 
district court for entry of an order directing MSP to make 
operations conform to the ruling and to provide a report on 
changes made within 180 days.52 
So what happened?  No further decisions have been published 
from this case, from the district court, the Montana Supreme 
Court, or other courts.  However, the Montana Department of 
Corrections (DOC) released a statement just two days after the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision was issued.53  The DOC’s 
statement disputed the findings of the court: “The prison uses such 
management plans to try and control inmates’ disruptive, 
dangerous behavior,” and “[t]he Court based its decision on the 
premise that Walker was mentally ill, but the DOC’s correctional 
experts who evaluated the inmate concluded he was not mentally 
ill.”54  The statement complained that the courts should not 
interfere with prison management, but then went on to say that 
“[t]he Court ruled that behavior management plans violate 
inmates’ rights to human dignity, but did not give the prisons any 
realistic alternative to control these behaviors . . . .”55  Despite the 
medical findings of the doctors in the Colorado Prison System and 
two doctors whose opinions were relied upon by the Montana 
Supreme Court, the DOC continued to deny Walker’s illness and 
stood by the inhumane BMP methods.56 
However, the Montana Department of Corrections 2005 
Legislative Report indicated that changes in the mental health 
treatment for prisoners had occurred.  First, a new intake facility 
was created, at three times the size of the previous unit, allowing 
the prison to “assess the needs of each offender and strategically 
place that individual in the appropriate facility.”57  The funding for 
 
 50. Id. at 885. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See DIANA KOCH, MONT. DEP’T OF CORR., CORRECTIONS RESPONSE TO 
MONTANA SUPREME COURT DECISION (May 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.cor.state.mt.us/news/NewsReleases/Archives/ResponsetoSupremeCo
urtDecision.htm. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. MONT. DEP’T OF CORR., A REPORT TO THE 2005 LEGISLATURE 18 (2005), 
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this new unit was provided by the fifty-eighth session of the 
Montana Legislature,58 which met in 2003-2004, but it is unclear 
whether the funding was a result of this case decision.  The report 
also notes that “[c]orrections in Montana faces some stiff 
challenges in the area of . . . mental health services for offenders,” 
but does not provide any explanation about what those challenges 
are or how they will be addressed.59  In addition, in Montana 
Women’s Prison, Medical and Mental Health Services became one 
unit in an effort to “provide more comprehensive health care to 
the prisoners.”60 
Mark Walker’s experience in MSP illustrates several of the 
issues commonly faced by prisoners in need of mental health 
treatment.  These issues include the delay in receiving mental 
health treatment,61 the inadequate time mental health staff spend 
with prison inmates for both diagnosis and treatment,62 and the 
failure of prison guards to identify and refer prisoners in a mental 
health crisis.63 
III. AFFECTED POPULATION 
How often can something as extreme as what happened to 
Mark Walker really occur?  Most people are aware that the U.S. 
prison population grew significantly in the 1980s and 1990s.64  
Today that population continues to increase.  In 2004, the prison 
and jail population in the United States grew to over 2,100,000.65  
Surprisingly, the prison population is greater than the total 
population of fifteen separate states or the District of Columbia.66  
 
available at http://www.cor.state.mt.us/Resources/Reports/2005Legislative 
Report.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 5. 
 60. Id. at 21. 
 61. See infra text accompanying notes 128-133. 
 62. See infra text accompanying note 139. 
 63. See infra text accompanying notes 134-135. 
 64. In fact, the prison population grew by more than a factor of four during 
this period, from 302,000 in 1979 to 1,319,000 in the year 2001.  THOMAS P. 
BONZCAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN 
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, 2 (2003) available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf. 
 65. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004, 1 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
pub/pdf/pjim04.pdf. 
 66. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL POPULATION ESTIMATES 2000-2004 (2004), 
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From July 2003 through June 2004, the population of prisons 
under state jurisdiction grew by 1.6%, and those under federal 
jurisdiction grew by 5.1%.67  At midyear 2004, the United States 
incarcerated one out of every 138 of its residents, either in prison 
or jail.68  As the number of inmates increases, so does the demand 
for services, including mental health care. 
A. Rates of Mental Illness in Prison 
The ever-increasing size of the prison population indicates a 
growing need for treatment of mental illness in prisons.  At any one 
time in the United States, approximately 5% of the population 
suffers from a mental illness.69  Compared to the general American 
population of similar age, prisoners are two to four times more 
likely to suffer from a psychotic illness or major depression, and 
about ten times as likely to have an antisocial personality disorder.70  
In a study based on self-reporting by state and federal inmates, as 
well as those in local jails, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported 
that in 1997, 16% of those in state prisons and local jails suffered 
from a severe mental illness.71  The rate in federal prisons was 
lower, at 7%.72  In a study of a smaller group of incarcerated 
parents, the percentages for both state (14%) and federal (6%) 
prisons were similar.73  No studies indicate why the rate of mental 
 
available at http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2004-01.pdf.  
The fifteen states are Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  Id. 
 67. HARRISON & BECK, supra note 65, at 1. 
 68. Id. at 2. 
 69. R. C. Kessler et al., A Methodology for Estimating the 12-Month Prevalence of 
Serious Mental Illness, in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES 1999, at 99 (R.W. 
Manderscheid & M.J. Henderson eds. 1999). 
 70. Seena Fazel & John Danesh, Serious Mental Disorder in 23,000 Prisoners: A 
Systematic Review of 62 Surveys, 359 THE LANCET 545, 548 (2002). 
 71. PAULA M. DITTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT 
OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 1 (1999), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf (the percentages were either 
based on inmates reporting a mental condition or on inmates having had an 
overnight stay in a mental hospital).  Most studies defined “severe mental illness” 
as psychotic illnesses, schizophrenia, mania, major depression, and antisocial 
personality disorder.  Id. at 2. 
 72. Id. at 1. 
 73. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATED PARENTS 
AND THEIR CHILDREN 9 (2000), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf. 
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illness in federal prisons is less than half of that in state prisons, but 
one possibility includes the types of crimes charged under federal 
statutes.  These include financial and large-scale trafficking crimes.  
Those with mental illnesses may not be able to function at a high 
enough level to be able to plan and commit these types of crimes. 
Based on the population totals of June 30, 2004, the United 
States held an estimate of 304,263 mentally ill prisoners.74  Because 
these statistics are based on self-reporting studies, the actual 
numbers may be even higher.75  Indeed, the National Commission 
on Correctional Health Care reports higher rates of mental illness, 
estimating that 2.3% to 3.9% of those in state prisons have 
schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder, between 13.1% and 
18.6% have a major depressive disorder, and another 2.1% to 4.3% 
have a bipolar disorder.76  NAMI (formerly known as the National 
Alliance for the Mentally Ill) reported in 1999 that the number of 
inmates with mental illness in prison was three times that of the 
number of non-incarcerated people hospitalized with such 
illnesses.77 
As the population that may suffer in prison through 
inadequate treatment and indifference grows, so must our vigilance 
in monitoring to ensure their right to treatment is met. 
B. Impact of Mentally Ill Offenders 
Besides the ethical, moral, and constitutional reasons for 
providing treatment to prisoners, by treating inmates with a mental 
illness, both prisons and the public can be made safer.  Studies 
have indicated that those with a mental illness may be more likely 
 
 74. This number was derived by using the population of prisoners in federal 
custody of 169,370, multiplied by 6.5%, which is the average of the rates in federal 
prisons, 7% and 6%, and then adding the population of inmates in state and local 
jail custody, 1,241,034 and 713,990, respectively, multiplied by 15%, the average of 
the rates in state prisons, 16% and 14%.  See HARRISON AND BECK, supra note 65, 
Table 1. 
 75. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE / MENTAL HEALTH 
CONSENSUS PROJECT 105 (2002), available at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/ 
cj_mh_consensus_20020601 (follow “Mental Health Consensus Project” 
hyperlink) (noting that prisoners, particularly those with mental health issues, are 
often unreliable in their reporting of factual information including that regarding 
their mental illness). 
 76. NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, 1 THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-
BE-RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 22 (2002). 
 77. NAMI, CRIMINALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL 1 (2001). 
9
Kosak: Comment: Mental Health Treatment and Mistreatment in Prisons
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
11KOSAK_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  10:03:51 AM 
398 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
to commit a crime than those without such illness.  For example, a 
study conducted in the state of New York found that men in the 
public mental health system were four times more likely to be 
incarcerated than other men; women were six times more likely to 
be.78  In state prisons, inmates with a mental illness are slightly 
more likely to be incarcerated for a violent offense (53%) when 
compared to inmates without a mental illness (46%).79  Although 
some argue these studies do not show a significant link between 
mental illness and violent crime, and many are concerned about 
the stigma these studies may place on those with mental illness, 
these studies provide an additional argument for treatment in 
prison. 
Treatment can improve safety in prisons by reducing the 
number of disciplinary infractions.  Inmates with mental illness are 
more likely than other inmates to cause violent disciplinary 
problems while in prison or jail, as Mark Walker demonstrated.80  
One study showed that while 25% of state prisoners without mental 
illness reported involvement in a fight, 36% of state prisoners with 
a mental illness reported the same.81  In the local jail populations, 
6% of those prisoners without mental illness reported being in two 
or more fights.82  When examining prisoners with mental illness, 
that percentage increases to 10%.83  Approximately 52% of 
prisoners without mental illness report being charged with 
breaking prison rules, compared to 62% of prisoners with mental 
illness.84  A 1996 study reported that while inmates with a serious 
mental illness made up 18.7% of the prison population, they 
accounted for 41% of the infractions.85 
Providing mental health treatment to those in prison may 
impact the safety of the public in the future.  Government studies 
suggest that, although offenders with mental illness are no more 
 
 78. Judith F. Cox et al.,  A Five-Year Population Study of Persons Involved in the 
Mental Health and Local Correctional Systems, 28 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES & RES. 
177-87 (2001) (analyzing data from the mental health and criminal justice systems 
of twenty-five New York counties). 
 79. DITTON, supra note 71, at 1. 
 80. Id. at 9. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 59-60 (citing R. JEMELKA ET AL.,  PREVALENCE 
OF PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY AMONG PRISONERS (1996)). 
10
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likely to be recidivists than offenders without mental illness, they 
might be more likely to commit violent crimes after release.  Of 
repeat offenders, 53% of state inmates with a mental illness had a 
current or past sentence for a violent crime, compared to 45% of 
those inmates without a mental illness.86  The comparison among 
state jailed inmates is 46% to 32%, and among federal prisoners, it 
is 44% to 22%.87 
Congressional findings, issued in the Mentally Ill Offender 
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, indicate that most of 
the prisoners with a mental illness are responsive to intervention 
that integrates “treatment, rehabilitation, and support services.”88  
Because of this responsiveness, along with the likelihood of violent 
recidivism, prisons should be taking advantage of the time available 
to treat their inmates. 
IV. INADEQUACY OF TREATMENT IN PRISONS 
Despite these reasons for providing treatment, many inmates 
with mental health needs do not receive the necessary treatment, 
or even minimal treatment.89  Among state and federal inmates, 
only 60% of those in need reported receiving treatment while 
incarcerated.90  Half said they had received prescription 
medication, and 44% received counseling or therapy.91  Roughly 
one-quarter reported being admitted overnight to a mental 
hospital or treatment program.92  Among those in local jails, only 
41% of those with mental illness received any form of treatment.93  
Of those receiving treatment, one-third had been given 
medication, and only 16% had received counseling or therapy 
while in jail.94 
Prisons in the United States do not provide all aspects of an 
effective mental health care system.  In most prison systems, what is 
 
 86. DITTON, supra note 71, at 5. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-414 § 2(6).  This Act was passed to establish mental health courts, but, 
as of the writing of this Comment, it remains unfunded in the proposed federal 
budget for 2006. 
 89. See supra Part II. 
 90. DITTON, supra note 71, at 9. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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provided is ineffective due to lack of funding, inadequate staffing 
to meet the needs of the entire prison population, lack of training 
for the health care and security staff, and lack of procedures to 
identify and track the needs of prisoners.95  Even with the best 
intentions, a prison system that does not have the necessary 
resources, adequate training, and skills, cannot provide effective 
mental health treatment to its prisoners.96 
Organizations, such as the National Commission on 
Correctional Health Care (NCCHC), individual correctional 
mental health experts, and courts, have defined general guidelines 
regarding what is needed for a positive mental health treatment 
program; however, no prison system meets all of those guidelines.97  
Specifically, NCCHC’s guidelines include screening all prisoners 
for mental illness at the time of entry to identify mental illness that 
arises during incarceration, providing a range of mental health 
treatment services including therapeutic interventions other than 
medication, maintaining adequate and confidential clinical 
records, and providing different levels of care, including 
emergency psychiatric services, intermediate levels of care, and 
“outpatient” services.98  The American Psychiatric Association 
indicates that mental health therapies provided to offenders should 
be multidisciplinary and also consistent with generally accepted 
mental health practices seen outside of the prison system.99  These 
services include verbal interventions, individual and group therapy 
as appropriate, and “[p]rograms that provide productive, out-of-
cell activity and teach necessary psychosocial and living 
skills . . . .”100 
The Supreme Court has not provided detailed guidelines 
regarding what is constitutionally required.  Circuit courts are more 
likely to lay out specifics for the prisons to follow.  For example, in 
 
 95. ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 94. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.; see also FRED COHEN, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED INMATE AND THE LAW, 
apps. A-1 to 31 (1998) (comparing standards for mental health treatment and due 
process issued by the American Bar Association, American Correctional 
Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Psychological 
Association, American Public Heath Association, and the National Commission on 
Correctional Health Care). 
 99. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS 46 (2d 
ed.  2000). 
 100. Id. 
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Ruiz v. Estelle, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas laid out six minimum standards for complying 
with the Eighth Amendment regarding mental health treatment.101  
First, a systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates 
must be utilized to identify those who require mental health 
treatment.102  Second, the treatment provided must be more than 
just segregation and close supervision.103  Third, the prison must 
have a sufficient number of trained mental health professionals 
participating in the treatment of prisoners, who must be treated in 
an individualized manner.104  Fourth, complete and accurate 
records of the mental health treatment process must be 
maintained.105  Fifth, prescription and administration of behavior-
altering medications in dangerous amounts is not an acceptable 
method of treatment, without appropriate supervision and periodic 
evaluations.106  Finally, a program of identification, treatment, and 
supervision of inmates with suicidal ideations is necessary.107 
Psychiatrists, psychologists, counselors, nurses, and 
recreational/occupational therapists are all necessary to provide 
effective mental health services for the wide range of mental health 
issues found in the prison system.108  But no specific requirements 
exist as to the number of these professionals needed for each 
prison or prisoner.  According to the American Psychiatric 
Association, the goal should be to “provide the same level of mental 
health services to each patient in the criminal justice process that 
should be available to the community.”109  Therefore, for example, 
the caseload of each full-time psychiatrist would be no more than 
150 patients on psychotropic medication at any one time.110  Other 
experts have recommended anywhere from 75 patients to 200 
 
 101. Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), reh’g granted, amended in part, vacated in part, 
688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). 
 102. Id. at 1339.  But see, e.g., Estate of Novack v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 
525, 532 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Eighth Amendment was not violated 
even though prison officials failed to properly evaluate an inmate’s mental health 
and prevent him from committing suicide). 
 103. Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1339. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 95. 
 109. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 99, at 6. 
 110. See id. at 7-8. 
13
Kosak: Comment: Mental Health Treatment and Mistreatment in Prisons
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
11KOSAK_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  10:03:51 AM 
402 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
patients per full-time psychiatrist.111  Such a caseload provides 
adequate time for diagnosis and development of individualized 
treatment plans.112  A study by Human Rights Watch (HRW) of U.S. 
prisons, however, found almost no prisons that approached this 
staffing level.113 
HRW found that the Iowa Department of Corrections had 
three psychiatrists and thirty psychologists to treat the estimated 
1800 to 2000 mentally ill prisoners.114  At the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, one psychiatrist works on-site for two days a month.  
In those two days, he sees twenty-five prisoners, while an average of 
thirty-two new prisoners are referred to him each month.115  A 1997 
report on New York state prisons found that the staffing had not 
kept pace with the rise in the prison population and that resources 
had not increased in years.116 
Questions also exist regarding the qualifications and 
competence of the prison mental health staff.117  The most recent 
study of this issue, in 1988, found that 40% of mental health staff in 
prisons had less than a master’s degree.118  The HRW report also 
raised the concern that mental health crises arise on weekends and 
evenings, when the mental health staff is not working.119  Usually 
the only alternative for prison guards is to isolate the prisoner, 
which often exacerbates the condition.120 
Identifying which prisoners need treatment is another trouble 
spot.  Logically, identification of mental health needs would take 
place at intake, when a prisoner is first admitted to a facility after 
conviction or transfer from another institution.121  The intake 
process provides the prison staff with the information necessary to 
determine the proper placement of the prisoner in the prison 
community, such as gang affiliation, personality, and propensity for 
 
 111. ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 95. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (citing Telephone Interview with Harbans Deol, Medical Director, 
Iowa Department of Corrections (June 14, 2002)). 
 115. Id. at 96. 
 116. Id. (citing NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, TASK FORCE ON THE 
FUTURE OF FORENSIC SERVICES—REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRISON MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVICES 9-11 (1997)). 
 117. See id. at 99. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 100. 
 120. Id. at 43. 
 121. See id. at 101. 
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violence.122  Because each prisoner automatically goes through 
intake, many prisons have found this time to be appropriate to 
screen inmates for mental health needs as well.123  However, 
according to the Department of Justice, as of 2000, thirty-two 
percent of state correctional facilities do not provide mental health 
screening of each inmate at intake.124 
Although the recommended guidelines indicate that screening 
of every prisoner should be done, no standards exist regarding how 
this screening should occur.  Often, screening for mental illness 
consists of a questionnaire for the prisoner to complete, but no 
standards exist for the questionnaires used, or for the training of 
staff who administer the process.125  The screening questionnaire 
can vary from system to system or even prison to prison.  In a state-
of-the-art program, the Michigan Bureau of Forensic Mental 
Health Services created a comprehensive prison-screening 
infrastructure.126  However, even this agency reported that, despite 
its efforts, six to eight inmates a month were processed through 
screening without a proper identification of their need for mental 
health treatment.127 
Prison systems across the nation have consistently been found 
not to provide timely access to mental health care, presumably 
because of lack of mental health staff.  Prisoners complain of 
waiting anywhere from days to months to see a mental health 
professional after requesting a meeting or to have their 
medications adjusted.128  A 1998 report on the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary found that out of ninety-five people referred for 
mental health services over three months, only six were actually 
evaluated.129  In Alabama, where mental health services are 
outsourced to a private company, mental health staff is present at 
 
 122. See PATRICIA L. HARDYMAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., PRISONER INTAKE 
SYSTEMS: ASSESSING NEEDS AND CLASSIFYING PRISONERS 8-12 (2004), 
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2004/019033.pdf. 
 123. See id. 
 124. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 529 (2003), available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/section6.pdf [hereinafter CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002]. 
 125. ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 101. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 103-04. 
 129. Id. at 104. 
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the prisons only one to two days per week.130  When a prisoner has a 
mental health emergency on a day when the staff is not present, he 
or she is placed in isolation until the staff’s next scheduled day.131  
As of June 2002, fewer than half of all state prisons provided twenty-
four-hour mental health care.132  Three states did not provide 
twenty-four-hour care in any of their prisons: Rhode Island (seven 
prisons total), Nebraska (nine prisons), and Missouri (twenty-eight 
prisons).133 
Prisoners often go untreated because security staff, or 
under-qualified and/or understaffed medical personnel, believe 
the prisoners are either faking their symptoms or are being 
manipulative.134  These prisoners are often improperly diagnosed as 
“malingering.”135  When prisoners do receive treatment, it often 
consists only of medication.136  For example, an investigation at the 
Putnamville Correctional Facility in Indiana found that eight of 
twelve prisoners whose health records were examined were taking 
psychotropic medication, and they were without individualized 
treatment plans.137  On average, 9.7% of all inmates in the United 
States were receiving psychotropic medications in June 2000, but in 
the most extreme states, over 20% received these medications.138 
The HRW report also details instances where effectiveness of 
medication is not documented or followed up on, prescriptions are 
written by doctors who have never seen the patient personally, 
medications are administered inconsistently, side effects are not 
monitored, and medications are discontinued rather than tapered 
off, giving rise to serious reactions from withdrawal.139  Although 
this treatment may not meet the ethical obligations of the doctors 
that provide this “treatment,” it is constitutional. 
 
 130. Id. at 105 (citing KATHRYN BURNS & JANE HADDAD, MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN 
THE ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 66 (2000)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, supra note 124, at 529. 
 133. Id. 
 134. ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 106. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. at 109. 
 137. Id. at 112 (citing Kevin Corcoran, Prison Mental Health Care: “Absolutely 
Atrocious,” INDIANAPOLIS TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997). 
 138. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, supra note 124, at 530.  The percentage 
of inmates receiving psychotropic medication in the four most extreme states were 
Montana, at 21.4%, Maine, at 23.5%, Vermont, at 28.3%, and North Dakota, at 
39.3%.  Id. 
 139. ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 115-20. 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/4
11KOSAK_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  10:03:51 AM 
2005] MISTREATMENT IN PRISONS 405 
V. RIGHTS OF PRISONERS TO TREATMENT 
A. Constitutional Rights of Prisoners 
Although inmates have a right to treatment of their mental 
illnesses, the prison staff must run an entire prison system, and 
therefore balance the needs of all the prisoners as well as enforce a 
safe environment.  In Pell v. Procunier,140 the Supreme Court 
explained the concerns that arise about legal challenges to the 
treatment of prisoners: 
An important function of the corrections system is the 
deterrence of crime.  The premise is that by confining 
criminal offenders in a facility where they are isolated 
from the rest of society, a condition that most people 
presumably find undesirable, they and others will be 
deterred from committing additional criminal offenses.  
This isolation, of course, also serves a protective function 
by quarantining criminal offenders for a given period of 
time while, it is hoped, the rehabilitative processes of the 
corrections system work to correct the offender’s 
demonstrated criminal proclivity.  Thus, since most 
offenders will eventually return to society, another 
paramount objective of the corrections system is the 
rehabilitation of those committed to its custody.  Finally, 
central to all other corrections goals is the institutional 
consideration of internal security within the corrections 
facilities themselves.  It is in the light of these legitimate 
penal objectives that a court must assess challenges to 
prison regulations based on asserted constitutional rights 
of prisoners.141 
Prisoners do not enjoy full constitutional protection.  
Furthermore, there is continued infringement of the constitutional 
rights they do have, “for the sake of proper prison 
administration.”142  The Supreme Court wrote elsewhere, “Lawful 
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of 
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the 
 
 140. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
 141. Id. at 822-23. 
 142. Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149 (2005) (citing Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) 
(finding that measures limiting a prisoner’s rights for the purpose of ensuring the 
security and order of the institution are not unconstitutional). 
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considerations underlying our penal system.”143  Unfortunately, the 
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act144 further limits the ability of 
inmates to find relief when their rights are violated.145 
B. Constitutional Rights of Prisoners to Healthcare 
The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth 
Amendment requires the government to provide care for 
prisoners’ serious medical needs, including mental health care:146 
An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his 
medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs 
will not be met.  In the worst cases, such a failure may 
actually produce “physical torture or a lingering 
death” . . . . The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is 
inconsistent with contemporary standards of 
decency . . . .147 
Despite their right to treatment, prisoners do not have a right 
to define the timing or the type of medical care they receive.  In 
Mark Walker’s situation, he wanted to continue taking his 
medication.148  After drawing attention to himself by discontinuing 
the lithium, he was given a different diagnosis.149  He suffered 
inhumane treatment and attempted suicide three times before 
filing a lawsuit and finally being diagnosed correctly again.150 
 
 143. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948); see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 
319, 321 (1972) (“[R]acial segregation, which is unconstitutional outside prisons, 
is unconstitutional within prisons, save for the necessities of prison security and 
discipline.”). 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000). 
 145. Id. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner 
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional 
injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”). 
 146. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1976); see also Bowring v. Godwin, 
551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (arguing that failure to provide treatment may 
violate the Eighth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, for deprivation of life); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1328 
(S.D. Tex. 1980), stay denied in part, granted in part, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981), 
stay denied in part, granted in part, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1982), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), opinion amended in part, vacated in part, 688 F.2d 
266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983) (arguing the duty to provide 
medical care mandated by the Eighth Amendment “is a direct consequence of the 
state's legitimate power to deprive a person of his freedom for a violation of its 
penal laws”); Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 3, at 462. 
 147. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103 (citations omitted). 
 148. See ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 93. 
 149. Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872 (Mont. 2003). 
 150. Id. at 875. 
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The State is only obligated to provide treatment for “serious” 
health issues, but various definitions exist for what is considered 
“serious.”  According to the Tenth Circuit, the obviousness test 
defines a medical need as serious if it is “one that has been 
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so 
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity 
for a doctor’s attention.”151  The Ninth Circuit defined a serious 
medical need as a condition that “could result in further significant 
injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” if left 
untreated, and “an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would 
find important and worthy of comment or treatment, [or] the 
presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 
individual’s daily activities . . . .”152  Clearly the Ninth Circuit 
definition provides corrections staff with a more detailed test and is 
therefore easier to follow.  But by either definition, the availability 
of treatment may come down to the specific doctor, medical staff, 
or even trained prison guard, and how that person views the 
symptoms described or exhibited by the inmate. 
Prison measures for providing medical treatment are evaluated 
against a standard of deliberate indifference, including a 
determination of whether there is an “unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain.”153  According to case law, deliberate indifference 
indicates an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, whether it 
is “manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s 
needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying 
access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the 
treatment once prescribed.”154  When prison officials find an 
obvious need for mental health treatment, a failure to provide 
treatment constitutes deliberate indifference.155  This indifference 
creates a cause of action under 42 United States Code section 
1983.156  An inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, 
however, does not create a cause of action, because it “cannot be 
said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ or 
 
 151. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1041 (1981) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 
1997)). 
 152. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Wood 
v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 153. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976). 
 154. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). 
 155. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). 
 156. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)). 
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to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”157  Deliberate 
indifference means that the prison official was “aware of facts from 
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”158  
Therefore, if a prisoner is receiving medical treatment, even if the 
treatment is not helping and better treatment options exist, the 
courts will not find an Eighth Amendment violation.  If the prison 
is providing medical care, then there is no deliberate indifference.  
A court will not consider the viability of other treatment options 
because that is best left to the doctors.  A difference in medical 
opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference.159  Only where 
the difference in medical opinion leads to such a serious illness 
that even a lay person could identify it, such as what happened in 
the case of Mark Walker, will the court find an obligation by the 
state prison.160 
For example, in Estelle v. Gamble,161 Gamble suffered from a 
back injury and complained of the treatment he received.162  
Although this case deals with physical ailments rather than mental, 
the courts have held that the right to physical and mental health 
treatments are the same.163  Gamble was seen by prison medical 
personnel seventeen times.164  He was checked for a hernia, given 
pain pills and muscle relaxants, and diagnosed with a lower back 
strain, but the pain continued.165  After a month, despite Gamble’s 
assertions that the pain had not diminished, he was certified by the 
doctors for light work, although the doctors also continued to 
prescribe pain medication.166  No additional steps were taken for 
further diagnosis.167 
 
 157. Id. at 105-06. 
 158. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
 159. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Franklin v. 
Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 160. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1041 (1981) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 
1997)). 
 161. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 162. Id. at 98. 
 163. See, e.g., Jones ’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001) 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment similarly protects the rights of prisoners to 
be treated both for physical and mental health ailments). 
 164. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 97. 
 165. Id. at 99. 
 166. Id. at 100. 
 167. Id. 
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Gamble was taken before a disciplinary committee for refusing 
to work.168  After hearing his complaints, the committee ordered he 
be seen by another doctor.169  This doctor performed a urinalysis, a 
blood test, and a blood pressure measurement.170  The doctor 
prescribed medication for high blood pressure and continued the 
back pain medication.171  After another two months of being 
prescribed pain medication, Gamble was again brought before the 
disciplinary committee for refusing to work.172  The original doctor 
testified that he was in “first class” medical condition.173  The 
committee placed Gamble in solitary confinement without any 
further medical examination or testimony.174  Another month 
passed before he was properly diagnosed and treated during a 
hospitalization for an unrelated heart condition.175 
Gamble filed suit, contending that the doctors should have 
done more to diagnose and treat his back pain.176  An x-ray was 
never taken, and he argued that other tests should have been 
conducted “that would have led to an appropriate diagnosis and 
treatment for the daily pain and suffering he was experiencing.”177  
The court held, however, that the prison staff was not deliberately 
indifferent to Gamble and his injury.  “A medical decision not to 
order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and 
unusual punishment.  At most it is medical malpractice . . . .”178 
Malpractice claims do not constitute an Eighth Amendment 
violation, but rather fall under state court jurisdiction for torts.179  
The Eighth Amendment does not require the most progressive 
health treatment available.180 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 101. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 107. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1991) (noting that the 
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons); Anderson v. Romero, 72 
F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 1995) (asserting that the Eighth Amendment does not 
require the most humane and progressive prison administration possible); 
Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1981) (arguing that the Eighth 
Amendment merely requires medical necessity, not desirability). 
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The court condones the stance that malpractice by prison 
doctors is constitutional.  It is when the constitutional rights of 
prisoners do not provide for adequate treatment, such as those in 
Estelle v. Gamble, that the system truly fails.  Although prison doctors 
have an ethical duty to provide adequate treatment, a lack of 
training, resources, and availability can hamper their efforts to do 
so.181  The Prison Litigation Reform Act, discussed below, prevents 
inmates from using the court system to obtain adequate care.182 
C. Right to Object to Treatment Methods 
Just like anyone else, prisoners have an opinion about their 
treatment.  They may believe they need treatment when their 
doctor does not, may believe they would do better under a 
different treatment plan, or may object to any treatment at all.  
However, unlike people outside of prison, they cannot simply seek 
a second or third opinion.  How can prisoners object to the 
treatment they are, or are not, receiving? 
Procedural due process ensures that legitimate government 
actions are administered fairly.  Vitek v. Jones is the leading case 
regarding the procedural due process rights of prisoners 
questioning an ordered transfer from a prison to a mental hospital 
for treatment.183  In Vitek, the prisoner did not want to be 
transferred from his current prison environment.184  Noting that 
commitment for ordinary citizens to a mental hospital triggers “a 
massive curtailment of liberty” which requires due process 
protection, the Supreme Court reviewed some of the liberty 
impacts on a prisoner.185  When a prisoner is sent to a separate 
mental treatment facility, the freedom that the inmate had is 
further curtailed, and stigmatizing consequences also follow.186  
The court recognized the major change to the prisoner’s life 
caused by the transfer.187  To provide protection to the liberty 
 
 181. ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 1, at 94. 
 182. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000) (“[N]o action shall be brought with 
respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”). 
 183. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
 184. Id. at 484. 
 185. Id. at 491-92 (citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)). 
 186. Id. at 492. 
 187. Id. 
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interest of the inmates, prison officials must at a minimum provide 
prisoners with procedures to protect their due process interests: 
A. When a transfer to a mental hospital is being 
considered, provide written notice to the prisoner, 
providing effective and timely notice of all of his 
rights; 
B. Provide a hearing after a certain time frame from 
the notice, giving the prisoner time to prepare, at 
which disclosure of the evidence being relied 
upon for the transfer and at which an opportunity 
to be heard in person and to present documentary 
evidence is given; 
C. Provide the prisoner with an opportunity at the 
hearing to present testimony of witnesses for his 
defense, and to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses called by the state, except upon a 
finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for 
not permitting such presentation, confrontation, 
or cross-examination; 
D. The hearing must be heard by an independent 
decisionmaker, although not necessarily from 
outside the prison or hospital administration; 
E. After the hearing, a written statement should be 
created by the factfinder as to the evidence relied 
on and the reasons for transferring the inmate; 
F. If the inmate is unable financially to hire his own 
legal counsel for this hearing, the state must 
provide him with one.188 
The court explained that, even though treatment decisions are 
inherently medical, the intricacies of a psychiatric diagnosis “justify 
the requirement of adversary hearings,” which balance the State’s 
strong interest in segregating and treating the mentally ill with an 
inmate’s strong liberty interest.189 
In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court addressed the 
nature of a hearing held when a prisoner does not acquiesce to the 
prescribed treatment.190  Certain factors guide the decision on 
 
 188. Id. at 494-95 (citing Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D. Neb. 1977)). 
 189. Id. at 495. 
 190. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).  The same due process rights are extended to 
inmates who are not yet sentenced but detained for trial. See Riggins v. Nevada, 
504 U.S. 127, 134-35 (1992). 
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whether or not due process requirements are met: “the private 
interests at stake in a governmental decision, the governmental 
interests involved, and the value of the procedural requirements in 
determining what process is due under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”191  Although those factors have not changed since 
Vitek, the court seems to have changed its mind on the adversarial 
nature of the proceedings. 
The procedures in Washington v. Harper provide the inmate 
with twenty-four-hour notice of a hearing to determine whether or 
not he will be forcibly medicated, during which time he will not be 
medicated, and an opportunity to be heard at that hearing.192  The 
hearing does not need to be conducted by the rules of evidence, 
and the standard of proof may be a simple preponderance of the 
evidence.193  The court also noted that state law provides the 
prisoner with an ability to have judicial review of the committee’s 
decision.194  The prisoner does not have a right to legal counsel.195  
Due to the nature of the decision to be made, they found that 
having a “lay adviser who understands the psychiatric issues 
involved is sufficient protection.”196 
The Court determined that the decision regarding forcible 
treatment can be made by a panel of medical professionals, without 
hearing any legal arguments regarding the liberty interest of the 
prisoner.197  The Court explained that the “Constitution does not 
prohibit the state from permitting medical personnel to make the 
decision under fair procedural mechanisms,” and the Due Process 
Clause does not require that the neutral trier of fact, a committee 
in this case, be a judicial or administrative officer.198  Although the 
committee members do not have to come from outside the prison 
staff, the people cannot be involved in the inmate’s current 
treatment or diagnosis.199  The Court also expressed concern 
regarding the impact of requiring judicial hearings for these 
 
 191. Harper, 494 U.S. at 229 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 472, 473 (1983); 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 192. Id. at 216. 
 193. Id. at 233. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id.; see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 499, 500 (1980) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (asserting the presence of a legal counsel is not necessary). 
 197. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 233. 
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decisions, stating that they would “divert scarce prison resources, 
both money and the staff’s time, from the care and treatment of 
mentally ill inmates.”200 
The implication is that the decisions to be made at these 
hearings, which are held in an effort to protect the legal rights of 
prisoners, are medical, not legal ones.  The court said as such in its 
holding, when citing Walters v. National Association of Radiation 
Survivors:201  “[I]t is less than crystal clear why lawyers must be 
available to identify possible errors in medical judgment.”202  But 
how can doctors balance an individual’s liberty right with their own 
medical recommendations?  Is the medical staff at these hearings 
trained on liberty interests, or how to identify or balance opposing 
interests?  Why does the transfer of a prisoner for treatment 
demand greater protection of liberty interests than forcible 
treatment of a prisoner?  Additionally, why does the exercising of a 
liberty right have to be in someone’s personal best interest? 
D. Legislative Impacts on Prisoners’ Right to Mental Health Treatment 
Although the Constitution provides prisoners with a right to 
health care and mental health treatment, their ability to use the 
courts to enforce their rights is limited through the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).203  The PLRA imposes significant 
barriers to prisoners who try to file grievances with the courts, and 
also limits the courts’ ability to address the issues they are able to 
see. 
First, PLRA takes several steps to inhibit the filing of claims by 
prisoners.  Prisoners must first exhaust their administrative 
remedies within the prison system.204  Before filing a claim in court, 
the prisoners must follow the grievance procedures in their prison, 
even if the relief sought cannot be obtained through this process.205  
Once those avenues have been taken, the prisoner must then pay 
 
 200. Id. at 227 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 605, 606 (1979)). 
 201. 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
 202. Id. at 336. 
 203. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000). 
 204. Id. § 1997e(a). 
 205. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 731 (2001); see also Porter v. Nussle, 
534 U.S. 516, 516-17 (2002) (stating that despite an agency’s inability to provide 
relief sought, or that administrative rules prohibit most inmate claims, the total 
exhaustion rule still applies). 
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filing fees to bring his civil action to court.206  If the prisoner cannot 
pay the total fees, a partial payment must be made, followed by 
incremental payments until the filing fee has been completely 
paid.207  The trial court must screen out prisoners’ civil complaints 
that do not contain a physical-injury component.208  The court may 
also dismiss cases through standard grounds, for example, the 
court may finds them frivolous or malicious, because the case fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or the claim 
seeks damages from someone with immunity.209  Finally, the PLRA 
limits the amount of attorney’s fees that can be awarded when a 
prisoner wins on his or her civil claim under 42 United States Code 
section 1988, likely discouraging many attorneys from providing 
assistance in these claims.210 
Second, the PLRA curbs a court’s ability to provide relief.  A 
preliminary injunction ordered in an unconstitutional confinement 
conditions case automatically expires ninety days after being 
issued.211  Prospective relief ordered after a finding for the prisoner 
must be narrowly tailored, extend no further than necessary, and 
be the least restrictive means available.212  Any prospective relief 
ordered will then terminate after two years upon motion of any 
party.213  To continue the injunction, a court must issue: 
 
 206. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2000). 
 207. Id. § 1915(b)(1)-(2).  To begin payment of the filing fee, the prisoner 
must pay twenty percent of whichever is greater: (1) the average monthly deposits 
to the prisoner's trust-fund account, or (2) the average monthly balance in that 
account during the six months preceding the filing of the complaint or appeal.  
Id. § 1915(b)(1).  However, if the prisoner lacks the assets or the means to pay the 
initial fee, he or she can still file the complaint or appeal.  Id. § 1915(b)(4). 
 208. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 
 209. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (applying to persons proceeding in forma 
pauperis in the district court or on appeal); id. § 1915A(b) (applying to prisoners’ 
lawsuits filed against a governmental entity or official); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) 
(applying to cases contesting the legality of prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 or some other federal law). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). 
 211. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (2000).  If the court makes the following findings 
necessary to grant prospective relief, the preliminary injunction will not expire at 
the 90 day mark: the injunction is (1) necessary to remedy a violation of a federal 
right, (2) is narrowly drawn, (3) extends no further than necessary to remedy the 
federal-right violation, and (4) is the least intrusive means of doing so.  Id. 
§ 3626(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). 
 212. Id. § 3626(a)(2).  A defendant can move for immediate dismissal if the 
court does not provide their findings of these requirements.  Id. § 3626 
(b)(1)(B)(2). 
 213. Id. § 3626 (b)(1)(A)(i). 
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written findings based on the record that prospective 
relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing 
violation of the Federal right, extends no further than 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and 
that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least 
intrusive means to correct the violation.214 
Although not directly attributable to the PLRA, the number of 
cases brought by prisoners against the corrections system has 
dropped significantly since PLRA’s passage in 1996.215  The number 
of new prisoner cases filed in federal district courts dropped from 
41,215 in 1996 to 25,805 in 2000.216 
E. Impact of Guidelines and Court Orders 
Prison officials are only required to provide the most basic 
care to have a program considered constitutionally acceptable.217  
Although guidelines are laid out for prison officials on what should 
be done by various professional organizations, these guidelines go 
beyond what courts have found to be constitutionally required, and 
therefore no impetus exists for the prison officials to follow them.218  
Additionally, court orders are only performed on prisons or prison 
systems that have been found to have violated constitutional rights; 
no court master looks to determine if that other prisons comply 
with whatever new standard is set by a court decision.  Also, because 
most prisons are state prisons and the court decisions are made by 
state courts, prisons in other states are not required to adhere to 
them.  Other state prisons have no need to worry unless one of 
their inmates with a mental illness actually manages to have his or 
 
 214. Id. § 3626 (b)(3). 
 215. See Christopher E. Smith & Christopher E. Nelson, Perceptions of the 
Consequences of the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Comparison of State Attorneys General 
and Federal District Judges, JUST. SYS. J. 295, 299 (2002), available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4043/is_200201/ai_n9026034/pg_
2. 
 216. See Todd Marti, From the Government’s Perspective: Has PLRA Worked?  Yes!, 
13 CORRECTIONAL L. REP. 69 (2002). 
 217. See COHEN, supra note 98, at 2-8.  The minimal components are generally 
understood to include a systematic program for screening, treatment consisting of 
more than just segregation and close supervision, treatment by trained mental 
health professionals, accurate and confidential record-keeping, prescription and 
administration of medications as necessary, and a basic program for identification, 
treatment, and supervision of inmates with suicidal tendencies.  Id. 
 218. Compare supra text accompanying note 217, with supra text accompanying 
note 98. 
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her case heard on the merits by a court. 
VI. MANDATED RESOLUTIONS 
What have the courts done to address the claims raised by 
inmates regarding access to mental health treatment once a 
violation of constitutional rights has been found?  With due process 
violations, clearly they have developed resolutions through a clear 
definition of minimum process requirements.219  But “[f]ederal 
courts are not instruments for prison reform, and federal judges 
are not prison administrators.”220 
Where Eighth Amendment violations have been found, a court 
generally points the way and leaves the details to the parties 
involved.  For example, in Casey v. Lewis,221 the federal district court 
of Arizona ordered the parties to meet and discuss proposals to 
remedy the areas in need within the state prisons’ mental health 
care system.222  Four months were allowed for the parties to agree 
upon a proposed remedy and file it with the court.223  Guidelines 
were given for what the plan had to address, such as staffing levels, 
facilities, medication administration, and monitoring.224 
One of the most famous cases of prisoner abuse and neglect is 
Madrid v. Gomez,225 dealing with the conditions at Pelican Bay State 
Prison in California.226  The prison opened and operated for five 
years without any psychiatrists on its staff.227  Systematic deficiencies 
in mental health care delivery were found.228  Here, the Eighth 
Amendment violation remedy was addressed through the 
appointment of a special master to work with the parties in 
developing a remedial plan.229  This master was appointed to work 
with the parties in developing a remedial plan.230  Every thirty days, 
the court was to receive a status update from the master, and at 120 
 
 219. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
 220. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 221. 834 F. Supp. 1477 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
 222. Id. at 1553. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1214. 
 228. Id. at 1216-17. 
 229. Id. at 1282-83. 
 230. Id. 
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days the parties were to jointly submit an agreed-upon plan.231 
In another case, after finding Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations of the rights of prisoners with serious 
mental health disorders by the California Department of 
Corrections, the magistrate’s recommendations were accepted by 
the United States District Court.232  Again, a special master was 
appointed.233  Development and implementation of two remedial 
plans were required within thirty days.234  The first plan dealt with 
the development and implementation of standardized screening 
forms and protocols; the second concerned medication 
protocols.235  Additional plans were required within sixty and ninety 
days.236 
The appointment of a special master allows for a monitored 
environment, where the improvements made are studied and 
documented.  This allows for greater assurance that the mental 
health treatment issues have improved, rather than the situation we 
are faced with in the Mark Walker case.  There we have only 
assurances from the Montana State Prison, the prison that denied 
Walker was ever mentally ill to begin with and the prison that put 
him in an isolation cell contaminated with blood, vomit, and feces, 
that they are providing adequate treatment.237 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
The size of the prison population in need of mental health 
treatment is staggering.  We have a duty, constitutionally, morally, 
and ethically, to provide treatment to meet the needs of these 
inmates.  We know what the needs are and how to meet them.  
Organizations such as NCCHC and APA have provided detailed 
guidelines regarding what is necessary to provide the necessary 
mental health treatment, such as screening all prisoners for mental 
illness at the time of entry and arising during incarceration, 
providing a range of mental health treatment services including 
therapeutic interventions other than medication, adequate and 
confidential clinical records, and providing different levels of care, 
 
 231. Id. at 1283. 
 232. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1323. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See KOCH, supra note 53. 
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including emergency psychiatric services, intermediate levels of 
care, and “outpatient” services.238  The U.S. prisons must implement 
these guidelines so we do not have more stories like that of Mark 
Walker. 
 
 
 238. See supra Part IV. 
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